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HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERPLEADER
RALPH V. ROGERSt
A PERSON who seeks relief through the medium of interpleader in
the majority of American courts must brave the musty and chilly winds
of ancient legal lore.' Winds which rustle through the leaves of the
later- and more corrupt -Year Books, and which are filled with
niceties and technicalities not unlike the technical quibbles often envoked
in opposition to an Original writ of the fourteenth century. In 1308 a
writ of entry, brought in the Court of Common Pleas, was abated on
the ground that it named the defendant "by divers surnames in divers
praecipes in one writ". 2 In 1882 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, in Third National Bank v. Skillings et al., held that mere lack of
privity between the adverse claimants defeated the petitioner's right to
relief by interpleader 3 The courts have long clung tenaciously to the
historical errors which have been read into the requirements one must
t Research Assistant, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Dean Ros-
coe Pound, Dean E. M. Morgan and Professor Z. Chafee, Jr., and to acknowledge
his indebtedness to them. The opinions here expressed, however, are solely those of
the author.
1. By far the finest discussions in print dealing with American and English cases
of interpleader are the articles by Professor Chafee: Aodcrnti.-ing Interpleader (1921)
30 YA .E L. J. 814; Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 id. at 685; Interpleader ins The
United States Courts (1932) 41 id. at 1134, 42 id. at 41; The Federal Inlerpleader Act
of 1936 (1936) 45 id. at 963, 1161; and Federal lntcrplcadcr Since the Act of 1930
(1940) 49 id. at 377. See also Scope of the Remedy of Interpleader (1901) 15 A1Mv.
L. REv. 61; The Requirenwnt of Privily in InterpIcader (1904) 17 id. at 489; The Scope
of Interpleader (1909) 22 id. at 294; and Interpicader in Tax Cases (1911) 25 id. at 174.
2. Cave v. Bardolf, Y. B. 2 Edw. II 34, pl. 117, 19 SELJN SOCIrT (1904).
Thousands of such examples could be cited. But see Anonymous, Y. B. Mich. 3 Edw.
11 128, pl. 27 (1309), id., where a writ was upheld against mere grammatical objections.
3. 132 Mass. 410 (1882) (bill in equity). This was also one of the grounds for
denying relief in Welch v. City of Boston, 208 Mass. 326, 94 N. E. 271 (1911), but the
decision in that case seems to rest principally upon another ground: that public policy
favors the prompt collection of taxes. This we submit is also a ground of decision sub-
ject to the criticism urged by Professor Chafee: the criticism that that policy should be
the prompt collection of just taxes. For a review supporting the decision in this case
see Interpleader in Tax Cases (1911) 25 HARv. L. REv. 174; id. 197. The New York
courts have taken a contra view and permit a taxpayer, who is about to be forced to
pay taxes assessed on the same property by two towns, to maintain a bill of interpleader
against the towns or their tax collectors. Thompson v. Ebbets & Welch, Hopk. Ch. 272
(N. Y. 1824); Dorn v. Fox, 61 N. Y. 264 (1874). And see Jackson v. City of New
York, 62 N. Y. App. Div. 46, 70 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1901) (injunction to remove a cloud
on title caused by illegal tax).
ORIGINS OF INTERPLEADER
meet in order to get relief by way of interpleader. 1 To clear away the
limitations attendant upon this "admirable remedy",' limitations which
have been erroneously grafted upon precedents dating back to the
Middle Age, we must see whether those limitations in fact ever existed.
In short, as Professor Chafee has put it: "Some discussion of the his-
torical origin of the remedy is essential",' to its understanding. That
discussion must be based upon a fresh investigation of the primary
sources of the English law.7
The doctrines of "privity" and "independent liability" until only re-
cently have been the great handicaps to relief by way of interpleader
in a great many cases where otherwise effective and just relief might
have been afforded by that procedure. These two limitations, that privity
must exist between all parties, and that the defendant must have in-
curred no independent liability, from the early part of the seventeenth
century to the present, have been justified as having existed at common
law. Our investigation of the sources of English law indicates that these
doctrines have been grounded in historical error. No such limitations
were imposed upon the form of "interpleader" which was allowed at
common law prior to the supremacy of Chancery in this field. Relief
at common law in the nature of "interpleader" seems to have been al-
lowed first in writs of wardship. Here, so it seems, we have the origin
of "interpleader" at common law, and here we shall begin our investi-
gation.
I. THE BIRTH OF COMiuON LAW INTERPLEADER
On the death of a man the question of who should have the wardship
of his minor children, and of their lands, was one which perplexed the
courts and prompted much litigation. The writ of wardship was well
established as early as Bracton's time, and the priority of claims of
different lords to the right of wardship was governed by strict rules of
4. The rigid requirements for a strict bill uf interpleader in equity, in jurisdictions
still maintaining a separation of law and equity, have for the most part remained intact.
And even under modern state statutes authorizing defensive interpleader at law some
courts hold that the settled doctrines applicable to bills of interpleader at equity are like-
wise applicable under the statutory action. Gonia v. U'Brien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 X. E.
787 (1916). For a comprehensive review of the American and English decisions rce
the articles cited note 1 .upra.
5. Chafee, Moden idnig Intcrpleadcr (1921) 3U YAiu: L. J. 814.
6. Id. at 822.
7. Id. at 822 n. 27. "The source of all other discussions of this topic is 2 R v,
HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW (Finlason's ed. 1869) 635-40. The Year BoPoLs and other pri-
mary sources ought to be investigated afresh, since many points might ha discovered
which escaped Reeves' attention.' It seems worth while remarking here that the words
garnishment and interpleader (or cnterplkder) are words unknown to the general inde-:
to HosWoR'rH, ISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1922-27), and so far as we can dis-
cover they do not appear in any of the separate indices of that set.
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law." Perhaps it was on the analogy of voucher to warranty in appeals
of larceny, and in litigation concerning land, that it was early decided
that the defendant in a writ of wardship could vouch to warranty.9 In
appeals of larceny if the vouchee appeared' ° and admitted that the goods
passed from him to the appellee then the appellee retired from tle
action." The same procedure was carried over into wardship cases.12
But, if one who made no claim to the wardship of infant children was
beset by multiple claims to their wardship, what relief was to be had?
Land descended along rigid lines; the devolution of personalty under
the tutelage of law and of the church was unlikely to cause much con-
flict. But here was a situation not squarely covered by either. One who
claimed no estate in infant children had no cause for voucher. It was
in such situations that we find the embryo of common law interpleader.
Drawing upon the analogy of voucher to warranty the courts very early
worked out a method of relief by compelling the adverse claimants to
"interplead".' 3
The first reported case of this nature seems to be that of Now~markel
v. Boville, decided by the Court of Common Pleas in 1313.11 In this
8. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 299-310.
9. Y. B. Easter 21 Edw. I p. 36 (R. S.) ; Y. B. Middlesex Eyre 22 Edw. I p. 437
(R. S.) ; Y. B. Cornish Eyre 30 Edw. I p. 177 (R. S.) ; Y. B. Mich. 31 Edw. I pp.
386, 390 (R. S.) ; Y. B. Trin. 32 Edw. I p. 244 (R. S.) ; Y. B. Easter 34 Edw. I p. 174
(R. S.) ; Y. B. Mich. 34 Edw. I p. 371 (R. S.).
10. His appearance was compelled by a writ. GLANVILLE Ii. X Cap. 16 [Woodbine's
ed. (1932) 145]; BaAcToN DE LEauaus f. 151 [Woodbine's ed. (1915-40) 426-27].
11. GLANVILLE li. X Cap. 15 [Woodbine's ed. (1932) 1441; BRACTON DE LEOalUlS
f. 151 [2 Woodbine's ed. (1915-40) 426-27].
12. See note 9 supra.
13. It is likely that analogy was also drawn from the cases where two parties claimed
adversely an estray in the lord's hands. From a report in BRACrON'S NOTE BOOK (No.
1115) we read of such a case in 1234. Presumably the parties "interpleaded" by produc-
ing suit (secta). When an estray was turned over to a claimant the claimant always
gave security to restore it in case someone else made claim thereto within a year and a
day. SELECT PLEAS IN 'MANORIAL COURTS 31, 2 SELDEN SocIE'rY (1889). In Y. B.
Eyre of London 14 Edw. II (1321) there is an interesting report of trespass for tile
false imprisonment of the plaintiff's servants and his two horses. The defendant was
the sheriff of London and he justified the detention in prison by showing that tile
guardian of the London Bridge found the servants "nutauntre apres eurfi sone anenatmt
ij. iuments . . . par qei il auoit suspicioun de mal." The inquest found that the defend-
ant was justified in the detention but found that the horses belonged to the plaintiff.
They were therefore delivered to the plaintiff on nmainprise upon condition that lie would
restore them if anyone else "les vodra lamer durraunt leyre." Presumably if such a
claimant had appeared they would have "interpleaded" as to the right to the horses,
Rogers, Year Book, Eyre of London 14 Edward II (1321) 34, pl. 5 in 18 MEmoIRs AMER.
ACAD. OF ARTS AND SCIENCES (1941).
14. Y. B. Mich. 7 Edw. II 162, pl. 15, 36 SELDEN SOCIETY (1918).
I
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case Thomas of Newmarket brought a writ of wardship"n against
Walter of Boville and claimed the right to the wardship of an infant
who is described -as John, son and heir of T. The defendant's counsel
appeared and produced the infant in question, saying that the defendant
"neither hath aught nor claimeth aught in that wardship save nurture
onlv",G but that since one Robert of E had brrought a writ of wardship
against him concerning the same infant he knew not to which of the
two claimants to deliver the child. "And he said that he was ready to
deliver [the infant] to whomsoever the Court should adjudge [the
wardship]". To this the plaintiff put in a replication to the eftect that
after the purchase of the writ the defendant married the infant to his
[the defendant's] daughter "and consequently he ought not to be dis-
charged of damages by reason of any disclaimer which lie hath made"."r
The defendant's answer seems almost witty: "The infant was not mar-
ried by Walter, but by his mother-in-law; ready etc.". But the court
took the matter in a different light and immediately gave judgment, anti
that judgment is well worth considering in full:
"INGE, J. You have said that the infant was not married on the
day of the purchase of the writ, and he is now in the nurture of
Walter and you have delivered him to the Court, as one in the
profit of whose marriage you claim naught, that the Court may
adjudge him to him that hath the right to his wardship. Seeing that
you are seised of the body of the infant and that you have said that
he is not married, when, in fact, he is married, you will he charged
with damages, for the claimant saith that lie is married to your
daughter, and the Court cannot, therefore, give his marriage to
anyone. You cannot, consequently, be now received to say that he
was married by another than yourself; and therefore, since you
admit that he was married while he was in your possession, and
you have brought him into Court out of your own possession, and
have delivered him to the Court as one that is not married, this
Court. consequently, adjudgeth that he that hath the better right
[to the wardship] shall recover against Walter damages to the value
of the marriage; and do you, who claim the guardianship, plead be-
tween yourselves".' 8
This statement is from a justice of the Court of Common Pleas! Could
anything be more the complete exaltation of equity and justice over the
15. Wardship was early held to be only a chattel interest. Y. B. Easter 21 Edw. I
p. 7 (R. S.) ; Y. B. Easter 32 Edw. I p. 187 (R. S.) ; Y. B. Trin. 32 Edw. I p. 245 (R. S.).
For later cases to the same effect see Y. B. Hil. 12 Edv.w. III p. 405 (R. S.) ; Y. B. Eas-
ter 12 Edw. III p. 511 (R. S.); Y. B. Trin. 14 Edw. III 277, pl. 37 (R. S.); Y. B.
Hil. 15 Edw. III 313, pl. 26 (R. S.).
16. Y. B. Mich. 7 Edw. II p. 165 (record), 36 SFJ.DEN SociFrT (1918).
17. Ibid. Cf. Y. B. Mich. 14 Edw. II1 225, pl. 93 (R. S.) (where infant ward %,as
married off by defendant after verdict in favor of plaintiff).
18. Id. at 163.
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strict and rigid common law? We would not burn daylight but we
would transpose this case into its component parts, and into the ter-
minology of a modern statutory bill of interpleader. C-1 sues A at law
for the guardianship of a minor child. One of the rights of the guardian-
ship is the right to marry the child to someone of your selection. A
comes into court and produces the child and says that C-2 has brought
a like suit against him and that he has no claim in the child (save
nurture), and is ready to deliver him over to whomsoever the court may
direct. To this C-1 counters with the allegation that A has married the
child to his [A's] daughter and so has done a wrong with respect to
the res. It is unlikely that on such a set of facts any court today would
grant A relief under a modern interpleader statute; and we can say with
almost no hesitation that if A were to come into equity with a bill of
interpleader against C-1 and C-2 the court would refuse to entertain
his bill. He not only has an interest in the res- a very real interest
for that res is married to his own daughter- but he has, moreover,
incurred personal liability by reason of his action toward the res. But
a majority of the courts influenced by the ghost of Grawshay v. Thorn-
tonu9 would deny the applicant relief because of the mere lack of privity
between the parties, ignoring the more basic issue. Not so in 1313.
"Modernizing Interpleader"?2o "Renovating Interpleader" would be
much nearer the facts. The Court in Newmarket v. Boville, and we
repeat, a common law court, granted a conditional judgment to a de-
fendant stakeholder who was subject to double vexation in respect to
one liability: (1) that adverse claimants should fight out their claim
as between themselves; and, (2) that to the successful party in that suit
the applicant for interpleader (the defendant in the original suit) would
be liable for damages by reason of his wrong.
The second case in which we see the embryo of common law inter-
pleader is the case of Mortimer v. Anonymous, decided by the Court
of Common Pleas in 1313. In that case the plaintiff brought a writ
of wardship against one E and alleged that E wrongfully deprived him
of the wardship of one J, son and heir of R of C. The defendant ap-
peared and said that one Adam had brought a writ of wardship against
him and claimed the person of this same J", and that he himself claimed
naught save nurture, and was ready to surrender to whomsoever the
court should adjudge. The defendant was told by the court to produce the
infant on the quindene of St. Hilary: "on which day [the defendant]
19. 2 Myl. & C. 1 (Ch. 1837). A most unfortunate result because of the profound
influence it had on later cases. While relief was denied principally on the ground of
lack of privity, the court in its abstract treatment of this requirement overlooked the
fact that privity actually did exist.
20. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader (1921) 30 YAiE L. J. 814.
21. Y. B. Hil. 7 Edw. II 74, pl. 20, 39 SELDEN SOCIETY (1922).,
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had himself essoined against R. of [Mortimer] by one essoiner and
against Adam by another". When we remember that Adam is not a
party to this action it seems strange that the defendant should have an
essoin (i.e., an excuse for not appearing in court) as against him. Was
he in the meantime made a party to the proceedings by the Court? Un-
fortunately the report is all too brief and the record of the case has not
been found upon the rolls. We are, however, told by a note appended
to the report that "R. of [Mortimer] and Adam appeared by attorneys
in Court and pleaded and joined issue on the priority [of feoffmentl
in the absence of [the defendant] who had the custody of the [infant'sl
body; and this because [the defendant] had by his answer, etc., dis-
claimed any right [in the wardship] ".- From this it is clear that the
defendant was allowed his prayer that the two claimants "enterpled".
How else could Mortimer and Adam join issue on the matter of "priority
of feoffment"? Two of the three versions of this report tell us that
the defendant E claimed nurture. The third version is silent on this
point: that silence perhaps being represented by the customary "etc.".
Under modern practice, whether it be in the defensive statutory inter-
pleader or the strict bill of interpleader in equity, if the applicant for
relief claims any interest in the res he is denied relief. We can cut a
claim of nurture down to its bare ingredients and still it is a claim
which would prove sufficient to prevent the applicant from being a "mere
stakeholder" as interpreted by English and American courts. Thus, it
would seem, the second of the modern requirements for interpleader was
not necessary under the practice prevalent in "interpleader situations"
in the early fourteenth century.
In the case of Thomas, Earl of Norfolk v. Elianore BlCkwetP-3 the
plaintiff demanded the wardship of the defendant's two minor children
and also various lands of which the defendant's husband, and father
of the children, had died seized. Before the defendant made any answer
at all one Eymar de Valence, Earl of Pembroke. made a like demand
against the defendant. After these two demands had been made- the
only writ mentioned is that brought by the Earl of Norfolk - the
defendant's counsel answered that "Elianore tells you that she claims
naught in the wardship save as mother and by reason of nurture, and
she is ready to render [i.e., deliver up] to whomsoever the court awards.
22. Id. at 75. The three versions of the case are read together here. The editor of
this Year Book has added a footnote to the word "disclaimer": "Exactly 'had dimblcd
himself'" by which he seems to miss the point entirely. The defendant by his answver
had not disabled himself; he had put himself out of reach of double liability and double
vexation.
23. Y. B. Mich. 12 Edw. II p. 361 (Ct of Comm. Pleas 131S). See also Y. B. ii.
12 Edw. II p. 376 for another action of wardship in which the present plaintiff (Earl of
Norfolk) is involved. The plaintiff Earl seems clearly to have been Thomas de Bri, her-
ton, Earl of Norfolk, Earl Marshal of England. BuRKE's Prs.Fr.u (1927) 1795 issiny.
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As to the wardship of the lands she says that the lands demanded are
her franktenement as purchaser with her husband". Immediately upon
this answer the counsel for the two claimants, one the plaintiff to the
writ and the other apparently an intervener, begin to argue the question
of the priority of their claim to the wardship of the children and of
the land. The defendant's claim to the land seems to have been com-
pletely ignored. Issue was finally reached between the two claimants on
the question of priority; but because it appeared that the plaintiff, tlht
Earl of Norfolk, appeared only by guardian, and the Earl of Peni-
broke by attorney, it was ordered by the Court that the two Earls appear
in propria persona on the quindene of St. Hilary. And here the reporter
injects a not altogether clear remark: "And I believe that this was
'degrace de Court' that this issue was received between the guardian
and the attorney, for it seems that their lords when they come, if they
wish, may replead. I shall inquire of that". The report of the case
continues: "And then the Dame found mainprise to have the children,
God willing, etc., one who was pfesent and who said naught, and the
other who was sick at home", before the court when ordered so to do.
The report comes to an indefinite conclusion, but the inference is clearly
that the two Earls were allowed to try out their priority right.24 What
of the defendant's claim to the land? Clearly she was not a mere stake-
holder standing indifferently between two adverse claimants. She had
a vital interest in the res, but concerning that the report is silent.
The case of Julyan Flitbor v. Alice Soler2" presents a quite similar
problem as to the original defendant's interest in the res. -ere the
plaintiff brought a writ of wardship against the defendant and demanded
the wardship of the body of the infant son of the defendant's husband.
One Ingham Tirel brought a similar writ against this same defendant
respecting the same wardship. Alice, the defendant in both cases, in
answer to Julyan's suit said that she "claimed naught save by reason of
nurture and was ready to deliver up to whomsoever the court might
adjudge" the right. A day was set to have the two plaintiff-claimants in
court in person, and Alice was ordered to produce the infant on the same
day. On the appointed day the parties claimants appeared in person and
took issue upon the question of the priority of their claim to the ward-
ship of the child. Alice, the original defendant, then spoke up and told
how Ingham Tirel on such and such a day had ravished the child out
of her possession, wherefore she prayed to be relieved of the responsi-
bility of producing the child as previously so ordered to do. To this the
counsel for Ingham answered that they had not had a day in court to
24. Following the report of this case is another short "abstract" of a similar case.
It is so abbreviated and so inconclusive that it does not seem worth while to do more
than merely call its existence to notice.
25. Y. B. Hil. 3 Edw. III 3, pl. 9 (Ct. of Comm. Pleas 1329).
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answer to this charge, and that if Alice felt she had "action", to bring
a writ and they would answer well enough. Herle, J., pointed out that
"she has claimed no estate save by reason of nurture, by which estate
she is not able to have a writ of ravishment [of ward], and if she not
be aided by this answer" she will be subject to distraint for her failure
to produce the child. Ingham's counsel countered with the reply that
"she would not be distrained to deliver up the child until after judg-
ment", but this argument was unsuccessful for he was put to answer
to the original defendant's complaint of ravishment. Can it be that the
court in these two cases even then had adopted Professor Chafee's ad-
mirable "three stage interpleader" plan ?21 After the two Earls in the
earlier case had tried their right was the "Dame" allowed to defend
her right? And in the last case was the original defendant's "cause of
action" tried out against the adverse claimants prior to the trial between
the claimants themselves? Of this we cannot be certain, but we do feel
sure that it was in these early cases concerning wardship that we have
the formal origin of interpleader of a later day.
Perhaps it may be well to summarize briefly the requirements for
relief by way of "interpleader" in these cases. In all of the cases we
have seen, save perhaps that of the Earl of Norfolk v. Elianore Blewell,
two suits were actually pending against the defendant for the same ward-
ship. In such situation the court had merely to order that the adverse
plaintiffs "interplead" between themselves. But even the pendency of
other suits does not seem to have been a requirement, for in Rasteil's
Entries2- we find a record of a case in which the defendant disclaimed
save as to nurture, but alleged that certain other persons also were
claiming the same wardship. There the record tells us that scire facias
issued to garnish (i.e., to warn) the adverse claimants to come in and
interplead with the plaintiff.28 From this it would seem that there was
but one requirement for relief from double vexation in these cases: that
the defendant be subject either to two claims or two suits with respect
to the same wardship. Privity was not essential,' indeed, it was lacking
26. The first stage is that in which the appli-ant scks to interplead adverse claim-
ants; the second stage the trial of the adverse claimant's rights; and the third stage the
trial of any interest the applicant may have in the res as against the successful claim-
ant in the second stage.
27. Fol. 388v (1596).
28. In fact the record reads almost exactly like that in detinue of a charter of a
later day when a third party was garnished by scire facias. But cf. Y. B. Mich. 14 Edv,.
IV 2, pl. 7 in which there is a dictum by Littleton in a writ of detinue case that "in
a writ of wvardship the tenant shall not have garnishment against such persons [strangers]
etc., but if t-wo bring several writs of wardship [the tenant] may pray that they inter-
plead."
29. "Martin, J. We put case where two writs of wardship are brought against me
severally by several persons returnable on the same day, demanding the same thing. I
shall show this to the court, and they shall be caused to interplead without privity Ling
1942]
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in every case. More important still, the defendant need not be a mere
stakeholder standing indifferently between two adverse claimants. It
would be hard to imagine a more liberal form of "interpleader relief"
than that found in these early cases concerning wardshipsao
II. THE GROWTH AND DECADENCE OF COmmON LAW INTERI'LIADER
The growth of the common law is reflected in its expansion: an ex-
pansion which not only is the result of pressure arising from increased
human contacts, but which takes its form and course largely by analogies
drawn from the past. Parties who had found themselves faced with two
or more claims respecting the same wardship of an infant and his lands
had found relief by having the adverse claimants try out their rights
between themselves. Here the defendant who sought relief was usually
an innocent holder of a chattel interest who was ready to deliver up
to "whomsoever the court might adjudge hath the right". The step was
but a short one from adverse claims laid to a wardship to adverse claims
laid against a bailee. But that step was to be taken cautiously: its growth
was to follow the growth of the law.
By the beginning of the fourteenth century it had become a common
practice to secure the performance of covenants or the doing of certain
acts by taking deeds either from the covenantor or from his surety. Those
deeds were then delivered to an impartial third person upon condition
that he was to redeliver them either to the covenantor or the covenantee,
dependent upon the happening or non-happening of the conditions speci-
fied. Parties who had innocently accepted deposits of deeds in this
manner soon began to find themselves in a vexatious situation. So far
as we are concerned here, a bailee of a chattel in this manner, and who
was willing to redeliver, found himself involved in either one of two
situations:31 (1) a writ of detinue for the chattel has been brought
shown by me between them." Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 43, pl. 20 at f. 44r. Accord, Y. B,
Trin. 9 Hen. VI 17, pl. 9.
30. "Interpleader" in wardship cases continued until that action went out of use.
For later cases see Y. B. Hil. 24 Edw. III 38, pl. 14; Y. B. Easter 24 Edw. III 24, pl. 3
(cont'd folio 42, pl. 24) ; Y. B. Mich. 24 Edw. III 31, pl. 11; Y. B. Hil. 30 Edw. Il1 5,
pl. 21; Y. B. Mich. 31 Edw. III, FITZHERnERT's ABRID1MENT (1565), Enelrpleder pl.
15; Y. B. Mich. 8 Hen. V 10, pl. 11; see also RASTELL'S ENTRIuS (1596) f. 388v.
See what appears to be a citation of the case in FiTzHEI.ERr, supra, in Y. B. 1fili,
7 Hen. IV 3, pl. 19.
31. The res may have been delivered to the bailee by two people jointly to be re-
delivered to either the one or the other of them; or, it may have been delivered by A to
be redelivered to either A or B dependent on the happening or certain conditions. What
is said here respecting bailees is likewise applicable to finders after the action of detinue
was extended to include them. Detinue seems to have been allowed against a finder as
early as 1371. Y. B. Easter 44 Edw. III 14, pl. 30 (detinue by the plaintiff for an ass
which he alleged strayed to the seignory of the defendant). The classical discussion of
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against him by one party and another party asserts a right to that chat-
tel, or, (2) two people have separate and independent actions of detinue
pending against the bailee for the same chattel.Y- In both situations the
bailee wishes the right to the chattel to be determined in one suit. If
lie were to deliver to either he might later be found liable to the other
claimant. To obviate the possibility of dtuble liability, defendants
in detinue were given relief "in the nature of interpleader", but for
procedural reasons that relief was to be known by different names in
the two situations. In the first situation "interpleader" was by way of
garnishment' because only one of the claimants to the chattel was before
the court; in the second situation all adverse claimants were before the
court and could be ordered by the court to "enterpled".a4 The first of
these we shall refer to as "interpleader by way of garnishment","' and
the second as "compulsory interpleader". Both developed with the action
the historical origins of detinue is that in A.\is. LEt-ruts i: LEGAL Hisxony (19131
70 passim.
32. A third situation is conceivable: A. L?, and C jointly bail a chattel to X. 1
brings a writ of detinue for the chattel; B brings a separate writ of detinue for the
same chattel; and C merely asserts that the chattel should be delivered to him. In such
a situation it seems that the court should order that .1 and B "entcrpkcd' and that scire
facias should issue to garnish C. Y. B. Hil. 11 Edw. IV 11, pl. 7 is precisely this third
situation. In that case C-1 sued A in detinue. A prayed "garnishment" of C-3. Then
C-3 sued A for the same res. When C-2 came in to "interplead" with C-1, the court
held A has no standing in court now and cannot pray that C-3 "enterpled". But the fact
that there were three separate sets of plaintiffs did not bar relief always: Y. B. Easter
4 Edw. IV 9, pl. 11. Cf. Michigan v. White, 44 Mich. 25 (18IR). FlH7ULPlERerr ADntwv.-
MENT (1565), Entcrpleder pl. 39 gives a puzzling note from Y. B. Hil. 34 Edw. III which
may be also this situation. Detinue was there brought by two severally against the
defendant for the same res. The defendant prayed "garnishment". As we shall see, if
all of the plaintiffs were in court "garnishnent" was nut the proper plea. But cf. Y. B.
Mich. 6 Edw. III 38, pl. 11.
33. "Garnishment" in this sense means "to warn." In a footnote to the wuord "gar-
nishment" in Y. B. 2 Edw. II 39, pl. 127, 19 SEL.DEn SociLn- (14L4), Professor Maitland
wrote: "That is, a writ 'warning' a person to appear. The word comes froim the inchtjative
tenses of garnir, to warn." Cf. La Lee v. Pykerel, Y. B. Hil. 10 Edw. 11 10, pl. 7 at p.
12 (1317), 52 SELDEN SocIETY (1934).
34. This distinction must constantly be borne in mind. "Interpleader by way of gar-
nishment" could only be had where one of the claimants to the chattel had not brought
suit and the other had. "Interpleader" in the second sense included cases where all the
claimants to the chattel had writs pending against the same defendant for the -ame
chattel. The failure to keep this distinction in mind has resulted in a great deal of con-
fusion, and even Brooke included eight cases of "interpleader by w\ay of garnishment"
among the twenty-nine cases he put under the title "Enterpleder." Brnomi's Anrruwr-
MENT (1573), Entcrplcder Nos. 1, 3, 10, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25.
35. We might call this "voluntary interpleader" for if the garnishee (the person
warned by scire facias to come in) failed to appear, the chattel which the defendant held
went to the plaintiff by default and no penalty seems to have attached to the garnishee
other than to foreclose his right to sue later the same defendant for the -ame chattel.
This is discussed below at some length. See pp. 934-43 infra.
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of detinue and they seem to have been an important source of relief
for harassed defendants until relief by strict interpleader in equity came
to be a "new found Haliday". We slall consider these two modes of
relief separately.
A. "INTERPLEADER BY WAY OF GARNISHIMENT"
A bailee who has accepted a writing from two joint bailors to be
redelivered to the one or the other upon the happening or non-happening
of certain conditions finds himself confronted by a writ of detinue
brought by one of the bailors in which it is alleged that the conditions
have taken place entitling the bailor-plaintiff to redelivery." The bailee-
defendant is ignorant of whether or not the conditions have taken place,
and while he does not claim any interest in the writing sued for he does
not wish to deliver to the plaintiff and later find that lie should have
delivered to the other bailor. The defendant therefore alleges that the
writing was delivered to him upon certain conditions and that lie does not
know whether the plaintiff is entitled or whether the other bailor (the one
who has not brought suit) is entitled to delivery. He therefore prays the
court that the third party to the bailment be warned (estre garny) to
come in and "enterpled" with the plaintiff. Thereupon a writ of scire
facias will issue against the third party to garnish him (to warn him)
to show cause why the plaintiff should not recover the writings stied
for. The third party, known as the garnishee, wheni he comes in to
"enterpled" with the plaintiff becomes the real defendant to the detinue
action and the original defendant, the bailee, is relieved of further
liability except that he will be called upon to deliver the writings stied
for to the successful party." It was in this fashion that the defendant
to a detinue writ was enabled to prevent possible double liability and
almost certain double vexation with respect to one duty. In short, he
was permitted to defensively "interplead by way of garnishment".
To see the development of "interpleader by way of garnishment" in
detinue of writings we must turn to the earliest reported cases. The
case of Daminory v. Polhampton (1316)8 appears to be the first case
of detinue of a writing in which the defendant-stakeholder prayed that
a third party be garnished. In support of his argument why scire facias
should issue to garnish the third party he pleaded that the third party
could "allege imprisonment or illness which we cannot plead, wherefore
36. The same thing is later true if the bailment is by A alone to be redelivered to
either A or B dependent upon the conditions, and either A or B brings the writ of
detinue for delivery. But the action grew up out of joint bailments.
37. RAsTELL's ENTRIES (1596) f. 214v contains the standard form of the record
made in such a case.
38. Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II 152, pl. 57, 52 SELDEN SocIErY (1934).
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he ought to be warned, for if the delivery is not made by award .,f
court, he has such action against us". However, from the record f
the case we learn that the defendant later admitted that he shi.ild have
made delivery of the deed to the plaintiff, and that he finally delivered
it "under the name of the aforesaid Walter [the third party so ught t4,
be garnished] as ready to be restored"." An Anonymous case two year,
later indicates that where the party warned failed to come in and plead
the original plaintiff had judgment.4" Five years later ii 1325 it was
held that the plaintiff could not bar the defendant's "interpleader by way
of garnishment" by alleging what may have been a fictitious and cOl-
lusive action of detinue said to have been brought by the third party
in which the present defendant had been non-suited.4 1 In these suc-
cessive stages we can trace the procedure in detinue of writings where
"interpleader by way of garnishment" is sought by the ctriginal defend-
ant until we come to the case of The Abbess of Barking v. John of Sul-
ton (1342).' Here the plaintiff brought a writ of detinue of a writing
(by which one Bartholomew of Langriche and John Ilankyn of Ongar
were bound to her in C100) against the defendant, and she cmuntcd
that the writing had been delivered to the defendant, as an impartial
person, upon condition that if certain covenants entered into between
the plaintiff's predecessor and a third party were not perftirmed then
the writings were to be delivered up to her. The defendant acknowledged
the delivery upon condition, but said he did not kniw whether the
condition had been performed, "wherefore a scire facias issued" against
Bartholomew and Joli. They came, and after some argument as ti
the validity of the entry on the roll, pleaded that the covenants were
not as the plaintiff had counted. To this the plaintiff's counsel replied:
"He who is party with us in our writ, namely J. of Sutton, has ad-
mitted the condition to be as we have counted; and you have come t-
answer whether you can say anything wherefore the writing aceording
to those conditions ought not to be delivered to us; wherefore the law
does not put us to answer to any collateral covenant". To this the counsel
for Bartholomew and Joln replied that "if he against whom you have
brought your writ be in league with you, and admit to you that which
39. Ibid. Cf. Y. B. Mich. 12 Hen. IV 7, pl. 12.
40. Y. B. Trin. 12 Edw. II p. 383. Accord. Y. B. Mich. 7 Edw. III 54. pl. .34 1scine
where garnishee appeared by attorney not properly authvrizedI : Y. B. LEaster 2 flen. V
5, pl. 23. Cf. Y. B. Mich. 7 Hen. IV 3, pl. 19, where it was held that the varrant f-4r
plaintiff's attorney to sue against the original defendant was sufficient as against the
garnishee.
41. Y. B. M[ich. IS Edw. II p. 577. The court pointed out that the suit may have
been fictitiously brought in the name of the party sought to be garnished and that lie
never appeared on the writ. There is a suggestion that if he had appeared the result
reached here would be otherwise.
42. Y. B. Trin. 16 Edw. III 119, pl. 32 (R. S.).
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was never true, that shall not prejudice me so that I shall not be admitted
to say that the covenant was different". After considerable argument
oin this point, on the analogy of diverse claimants to a wardship where
the defendant disclaims right therein, save as to nurthre, 43 the court
held: (1) that Bartholomew and John could traverse the count as to
the conditions; (2) that the action should proceed as between the abbess
and them; and, (3) that the damages should go against the unsuccessful
claimant and not the one "against whom the Original writs were
brought".44 The court seems to rest its holding squarely upon the analogy
of the wardship cases in which the disclaiming defendant is allowed to
substitute a third party who claims the same wardship of him. The
court pointed out that in the wardship cases when the two claimants are
in court they can take issue upon the priority of their rights, and that
the original defendant is relieved of further liability.
45
We can trace the history of "interpleader by way of garnishment" in
a continuous line of decisions and records down through the reign of
Edward IV (1483). It is a history rich in details, and while many of
the details are of matters which might well be classified as abstract learn-
ing if considered alone, when viewed as a whole they fit into an orderly
and well arranged picture. One might well write a history on the service
of the writ of scire facias which issued to warn the adverse claimant 4"
43. Id. at 142.
44. Ibid. I do not understand the use of the plural "writs" here. Only one writ
of detinue had been brought against tile defendant.
45. An interesting case illustrating the newness of the procedure in these Cases is
reported in Y. B. Easter 5 Edw. I1 17, pl. 15. There the plaintiff counted upon a
joint bailment made by himself and one Robert to the defendant upon certain condi-
tions. The defendant's counsel said that the defendant did not know whether the condi-
tions were performed and he "prayed judgment whether we ought to answer without"
Robert. Herle, C. J., said: "Then plead your plea in the manner in which it should
be pleaded . . . pray writ to warn Robert to be here on a certain day .
And the defendant did so. The defendant's original answer sounds very much like a
prayer in aid. Cf. William of Grave v. Anon., Y. B. Trin. 7 Edw. III 29, pl. 23 (1333);
William White v. Vicar of Holbeach, Y. B. Hil. 19 Edw. III A161, p1. 22 (1344-45)
(R. S.) (garnishee appeared and original defendant relieved); Prior of St. Oswald v.
William de Brokelesby, Y. B. Trin. 19 Edw. III 277, pl. 60 (1345) (R. S.) (garnishee ap-
peared and traversed the conditions alleged by the plaintiff; issue joined thereon) ; Y. A,
Mich. 20 Edw. I1 199, pl. 10 (R. S.) (garnishee appeared and driven to elect upon which
of his two pleas he would take issue).
46. If scire facias issues against a husband and his wife'and it is returned that the
husband is dead must a new scire facias issue as against the wife? Y. B. Mich. 44 Edw.
III 33, pl. 17; Y. B. Mich. 44 Edw. I1 34, pl. 22; Y. B. Trin. 12 Hen. IV 23, pl. 4. If the
garnishee is dead then his heirs must be warned. Y. B. Mich. 21 Edw. III 41, pl. 44.
Or, his executors. Y. B. Hil. 5 Hen. V 11, pl. 27; Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 11, pl. 42; Y. B.
Mich. 19 Hen. VI 9, pl. 24; Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 23, pl. 46; Y. B. Hil. 21 Hlen. VI
27, pl. 10. Or, the heirs and the ordinary. Y. B. Hil. 6 Edw. IV 11, pl. 5. It seems
that one may have any number of writs of scire facias in order to get in the interested
parties. Y. B. Easter 48 Edw. III 30, pl. 19. Misnomer in the scire facias is not a
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but from our point of view the important thing is that once the garnishee
had been served4" and appeared 48 the original defendant retired from
the action,49 and the suit proceeded as between the bailors.;" If the
garnishee, after proper service, failed to appear, the plaintiff had judg-
ment for delivery of the chattels sued for."' Conversely, if the plaintiff
made default on the day on which the garnishee was warned to appear, the
garnishee had a like judgment.5 2 While the garnishee could not traverse
good plea in bar by the garnishee. Y. B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI 37. p1. 37. The %,.rit of 5eire
facias issues in the name of the defendant. Y. B. Easter 3 Hlen. VI 40, pl. 4. \\h\kre
scire facias issues as against two who are not husband and wife and one is slvad, there
is some conflict in the decisions whether on reissue against the dead per,,.n's heir., or
executors there must also be a new return as against the other party. Y. B. Mich. 9
Hen. VI 36, pl. 10; Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 32, pl. 63; Y. B. Hit. III Heil. VI 54. p1.
18; Y. B. Easter 19 Hen. VI 66, pl. 11; Y. B. Hit. 21 Hen. VI 27, pl. 10; Y. 11. Midh.
14 Edw. IV 1, pl. 3. Scire facias will issue in the county %%here the garnishee ha . a t
Y. B. Hil. 6 Edw. IV 11, pl. 5.
47. Cf. Y. B. Mlich. 12 Hen. IV 10, pl. 17.
48. The garnishee must appear in propria persona. Y. B. Mich. 17 Edw. III 3'9l, 111
97 (R. S.) ; cf. Y. B. Hi. 2 Edw. III 18, pl. 24; see Y. B. Mich. 8 Hen. VI 16, p1. 41,
where garnishment was prayed "for the common cause" and the sheriff returned on the
alias that the garnishee had naught by which he might be warned. The garnishee never-
theless appeared in person and over plaintiff's objection "that he had not a day in c'jurt"
was allowed to "interplead" with the plaintiff.
49. Y. B. Hil. 19 Edw. III 461, pl. 22 (R. S.) ; Y. 1. Mich. 39 Edw. Ill 22, pl. 12;
Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 11, pl. 42; cf. Y. B. Hit. 7 Hen. IV 7, pl.4 and Y. B. Midi. 7 Hen.
VI 11, pl. 28. By "lusage en tiel cas" the defendant does n''t deposit the res in court, Iout
the successful claimant has distress against him for the res. Y. B. Mich. 9 Hen. VI Z J, 1.
10; accord, Y. B. -Mich. 9 Hen. VI 38, pl. 13 (but quacre, can the defendant later su
an attaint?). The defendant is out of court hut it seems that he may later have a vrit
of error. Y. B. Easter 21 Hen. VI 35, pl. 2; cf. Y. B. 'Mid. 8 Hen. VI 4, pl. 11 and iiri.
11, p1.28; Y. B. Amo 14 Hen. VI 11, pl.42. The defendant is out of c.,urt t. #uch an
extent that he may not even plead that a third party has since sued for the ame chattcl
and therefore ask that that party be compelled to "interplead". Y. B. Hit. 11 Edwv. IV 11,
pl. 7, discussed in note 32 supra.
50. Damages go against the garnishee. Y. B. Mich. 3 Hen. VI 18, pl. 24J; Y. B.
Trin. 7 Hen. VI 45, pl. 27 (the garnishee not being put in prison for the damages, excCu-
tion ran only against his goods and chattels; the reporter adds "quia mirum") ; Y. 1.
Mich. 9 Hen. VI 38, pl. 13. But do the damages go against the garnilshce if he d,,C si't
appear? Cf. Y. B. Easter 21 Hen. VI 35, pl. 2 and Y. B. Mich. 27 Heil. VI 2, pI. 11.
51. Y. B. Easter 21 Hen. VI 35, pl. 2; Y. B. Mich. 27 Hen. VI 4, pl. 27 (fin gar-
nishee's default plaintiff recovers deeds sued for but no danrages). Contra: Y. U. Mich.
8 Hen. VI 4, pl. 11 (damages may be taxed against garnishee on his default). When
two parties are garnished, if one defaults, plaintiff shall have judgment as against hin
but the other is allowed to interplead. 1. B. Easter 2 Hen. V 5, pl. 23. Accord, Y. B.
Hil. 2 Hen. VI 16, pl. 22. See also Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 45, pl. L7 and Y. Ii. Mich.
4 Hen. VI 9, pL 26, where garnishee defaulted but protection was put forth ftr him.
52. Y. B. 'Mich. 40 Edw. III 39, pl. 15; Y. B. Easter 21 Hen. VI 35, pl. 2) But
neither the plaintiff nor the garnishee were entitled to judgment for default of the orig-
inal defendant on the day when the garnishee came in. Y. B. Mich. 39 Edw. III 22,
pl. 13; Y. B. Hil. 2 Rich. II Fn-zanEaRT's AamivmENt (1565), Lnicrplcdcr pl. 13.
Cf. Y. B. Mich. 40 Edw. III 39, pl. 15.
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the conditions originally counted by the plaintiff and admitted by the
defendant5" he could successfully plead that the plaintiff had released
to him the debt due in the writing sued for. 4 The plaintiff could not
charge the garnishee on matters not in the original writ of detinue,0
nor was the garnishee allowed to counterclaim for a writing not stied
for in the original writ brought by the plaintiff."" We are told that the
bailors could not proceed directly against one another concerning the
right to the chattels in the hands of their bailee,57 and that it was against
right and reason that both bailors should have judgment for the same
chattel where the defendant was not at fault."'
These details have been treated much more cavalierly than they should
have been. This has been done because there seem to be at least three
matters which call for more extensive treatment. These are put in the
53. Y. B. Hil. 40 Edw. III 11, pl. 25. But he may traverse a sheriff's return which
goes to the performance of the conditions. Y. B. Mich. 11 Heil. IV 18, pl. 22. Cf. Y. B.
Trin. 3 Hen. VI 50, pl. 13; Y. B. Trin. 11 Hel. VI 50, pl. 9. But see Y. 1. Trill. lf
Edw. III 119, p. 32 (R. S.) and Y. B. Trin. 19 Edw. III 277, pl. 60 (R. S.).
54. Y. B. Mich. 39 Edw. III 22, pl. 13 (the plaintiff took nothing by his writ since
it would avail him nothing to get the writing sued for). Cf. Y. B. Easter 34 Edw. III
FITZHER"ERT'S ABRIDGMENT (1565), Garnishment pl. 38; Y. B. Easter 49 Edw, II1 13,
pl. 6. Contra, Y. B. Easter 20 Hen. VI 28, pl. 23. Pleas: Tile garnishee could plead
excommunication of plaintiff on day the original writ was purchased, Y. B. Easter 3
Hen. VI 39, pl. 6. Misnomer in the scire facias was not a good plea in bar by the gar-
nishee, Y. B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI 37, pl. 37. Garnishee not allowed to plead in abatement that
defendant in original writ was not the proper party, Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 40, pl. 9;
nor that plaintiff was femic sole when bailment made, Y. B. Trin. 3 Hen. VI 50, pl. 13.
Garnishee not allowed to plead in abatement that earlier writ by plaintiff against de-
fendant alleged bailment to have been made elsewhere, Y. B. Easter 7 Hen. VI 34,
p. 35. Plea by garnishee that plaintiff agreed in writing to arbitrate all their disputes
not allowed, Y. B. Triu. 7 Hen. VI 40, pl. 10. The garnishee cannot plead that lie alone
bailed to defendant, Y. B. Mich. 20 Edw. IV 13, pl. 16. Cf. Y. B. Eastcr 11 Hen. VI 40,
pl. 34 and Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 11, pl. 42. After the garnishee enters the plaintiff cannot
allege that garnishee did not join in the bailment, Y. B. Mich. 39 Edw. III 22, pl. 12.
Concerning pleas see Y. B. Trill. 9 Hen. VI 14, pl. 3; Y. B. Mich. 9 Hen. VI 38,
pl. 13; Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 46, pl. 99; Y. B. Mich. 21 Hen. VI 18, pl. 33; Y. B.
Trin. 21 Hen. VI 52, pl. 7; Y. B. Mich. 34 Hen. VI 1, pl. 1; Y. B. Mich. 21 Edw. IV 54,
pl. 26. On the question whether the garnishee could plead that he alone delivered to
defendant, see Y. B. Easter 11 Hen. VI 40, pl. 34; Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 11, pl. 42; anld,
Y. B. Mich. 20 Edw. IV 13, pl. 16.
55. Y. B. 36 Hen. VI 26, pl. 25 (garnishment had, and garnishee pleaded that he
had tendered to fulfill the conditions-the payment of 30s--and that plaintiff had refused.
It was held that plaintiff was to have judgment for return of deeds sued for but no dan:-
ages and garnishee need not now offer to tender the 30s since the plaintiff's demand is
only for the deeds).
56. Y.B. Mich. 9 Hen. V 11, pl. 9 ; Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 11, pl. 41, Cf. Y. B. Mich.
39 Edw. III 22, pl. 13.
57. Y. B. Easter 49 Edw. III 13, pl. 6. Accord, Horner v. Lehman, 130 Md. 275,
100 At. 285 (1917).
58. Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 43, pl. 20.
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form of questions. First, was privity between the plaintiff and the
garnishee essential? Second, did independent liability of the bailee-
defendant bar "interpleader by way of garnishment"? Third, was the
judgment in the action brought by tile plaintiff against the bailee-
defendant res judicata as against another claimant where scire facias
issued to garnish him? To these three questions we now turn our
attention.
Privity. In every case that has come to our attention down to 1422
privity in fact existed between the plaintiff and the person sought to
be garnished. But the existence of that relationship was due solely to the
practice which had groin up for parties to a contract jointly to bail (leeds
into the hands of an impartial person to secure the performance of the
contract.59 The action of detinue of a writing had developed as a method
of charging a bailee, and with the development of the writ there had
grown up relief afforded by "interpleader by way of garnishment" where
only one of the bailors had brought suit for redelivery of the deeds.
But, at the beginning of Henry VI's reign we notice a changed atmos-
phere. For the first time we hear the plaintiff urging that the defendant
is not entitled to garnishment of an outsider - or a stranger, as he was
called. In the first case in which this argument was advanced, while
the arguments were being made, the party whom the defendant sought
to garnish sued a writ of detinue against the defendant for the same
res as that sued for by the first plaintiffCo Then arose the question
whether the two plaintiffs should now "enterpled", or whether scire facias
still should issue. Unfortunately the report leaves us without an answer,
and the reporter quite appropriately added: "quia bonus casus"." In
the case of Rafe Cromwel v. Edinound Moris6 2 decided by the Court
of Common Pleas in 1424, there are dicta by justices Martin and Bab-
ington to the effect that it is not necessary that privily exist between
the plaintiff and the one sought to be garnished, and that the only privity
necessary is that between the proposed garnishee and the res; in other
words, that the proposed garnishee have some claim against the defend-
ant for the res. Martin, J., argues that the innocent defendant should
not be charged twice for the same res, and he draws an analogy to
59. The cases prior to 1422, so far as I can discover, are all cases in which the de-
fendant seeks to have "interpleader by way of garnishment" of the plaintiff's joint bailor.
60. Y. B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI 35, pl. 31. Cf. Y. B. Mich. 20 Edw. IV 13, pl. 16 where
the court delayed judgment in order to give the garnishee opportunity to sue his ov.ii
writ of detinue so that he might get in a special plea. But see note 61 in fra.
61. If scire facias had issued to warn the third party and he had then brought a
like writ of detinue against the defendant, it was later held that the defendant vas out
of court to such an extent that he could not call upon the plaintiffs to "interplead' Y.
B. Hil. 11 Edw. IV 11, pl. 7. See note 32 supra.
62. Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 43, pl. 20. This was a case of "compulsory interpleader",
discussed infra p. 943.
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writs of wardship in which it is not necessary for the defendant to show
the existence of privity between the two parties making adverse claims
to the same wardship. Babington, J., makes an equally strong argument,
putting the case of a finder of "deeds in the road". These dicta show
quite clearly the feeling of at least two of the judges of the Court of
Common Pleas. On the other hand, Cokain, J., argued that scire facias
should not issue to warn one unless he be in privity with the plaintiff
to the bailment, but Martin and Babington, JJ., carried the day.
03
We have been able to find only one case in which there is a square
decision upon this point. It is, however, a decision by Littleton when
he was a justice of the Court of Common Pleas, and is worth careful
consideration. To a writ of detinue the defendant pleaded that the goods
sued for were delivered to him by the plaintiff upon certain conditions,
to wit, that if one A performed certain services the goods were to be
delivered to the said A, and if not they were to be redelivered to the
plaintiff, and that he did not know whether the services had been per-
formed, and therefore he prayed that A be garnished." It was urged
on behalf of the plaintiff that A should not be garnished since he was
shown to be a stranger to the bailment. The plaintiff's counsel 0 argued
that "for this reason [lack of privity between adverse claimants] in a
writ of wardship the tenant should not have garnishment against such
persons . . [and] . . . If J S delivers to me certain money to deliver
to A, here if J S brings a writ of account against me I shall not have
garnishment against A for he is a stranger to the receipt, and so here".
To this argument Littleton, J., made a most precise answer in which he
stated clearly the law with respect to privity:
"In your case of wardship and account etc. garnishment does
not lie in the nature of the action etc. 60 And the same law is appli-
cable in debt etc. But in detinue it is otherwise etc. In this case
A is to have an advantage by the condition and so A ought to have
a writ of detinue against the defendant etc.07 wherdfore it is reason
[enough] that he be garnished; wherefore etc. Which PIGOT con-
ceded."
These are the "evidences" to support our conclusion that privity between
the plaintiff in detinue and the party sought to be garnished need not
be shown.'
Independent Liability of the "defendant-applicant". In an action of
detinue brought by Beatrice, widow of the "Count Darundel" against an
63. Cf. Y. B. Mich. 21 Hen. VI f. 2 (dictum by Markham).
64. Y. B. Mich. 14 Edv. IV 2, pl. 7.
65. The counsel who made this argument are not named. The report merely states
"And it was moved by some."
66. As to wardship see pp. 925-32 supra.
67. Is this a suggestion of a right of action in a third party beneficiary?
68. See also Y. B. Mich. 14 Edw. IV 2, pl. 7.
[Vol. 51 - 9.24940
ORIGINS OF INTERPLEADER
anonymous A, heard in the Court of Common Pleas in 1423, the plain-
tiff sought to recover a sealed instrument.G The defendant said that he
was ready to deliver the obligation, but that since it had been delivered
to him by the plaintiff and by one John Pellam upon certain conditions,
concerning the performance of which he had no knowledge, he asked
that Pellam be garnished. Thereupon he put "forth in court an obliga-
tion, which was not sealed". The plaintiff at once asked judgment on
the ground that the defendant by offering "an escrow which is not under
seal" had not answered to the writ. To this the defendant offered to
69. Y. B. Trin. 2 Hen. VI 16, pl. 19. The "Count Darundel" presumably refers ts'0
the Earl of Arundel "(a feudal honour as adjudged in parliament 8 July. 1433. 11th
Henry VI.), by possession of Arundel Castel only, without any creation:* Befn'ns.
PEERAGE (1927) 1795 passim. Dean Mforgan has very kindly ptonted out to me
that different people might disagree on the correct interpretation isf this case. It
seems to me, however, that any interpretation of the case other than that here given
can only come from an attempt to read into it twentieth-century ideas. The case must
be considered not in light of what we know now but in light of what lawyers and judges
knew in 1423. With this word of warning it has been thought wise to set the case out
in full here. "D-rmIxE fuit porte par vii Beatrice que fuit la fenime la counte Darundl
enuers vn T., et demaunda le liuere dun obligacioun de M. K. ell que Iohan Pellam fuit
tenus a luy. STRANGWAYS. Sir, vous auez cy le dit T. que est prist oue le dit obliga-
cioun, mes it dit que lobligacioun fuit liuere a iuy par le pleintif et par vn I[ohan]
P[ellam] sur certein condicions et le quel lez condicions sount peremples on nemy it tie
sauera, par que il pria vn scire facias enuerz le dit Iohan (Pellam] a respoundre si etc. Et
sur ceo il mist auaunt en le court vii obligacion, le quel ne fuit my enseale, par que etc. \Ws-,;r-
BuRy. Sir, vous veies bien coment nouz deinaundoins vn obligacion, et ii lie inete auant
forsqez vii escrow, le quel nest my enseale et issint il respound riens a n'lns, par que
pur default de respouns nous prioms la liuere. STRnANGWAYS. Nous dioms en fait que
cest fait que nous mittoms auant est mesne le fait que fuit liuere a nu.us par le pleintif
et par le dit Iohan [Pellam] sur certein condicions, le quel matter nous voilloms atterere,
par que nous prioms garnisement. NVEsTBsuRv. A ceo dioms nouis que cel fait al temps
del liuere fuit bon et loialment enseale oue vn print sufficient, le quel niattre nous vtil-
loms auerere, et issint esteant le fait en vostre gard le prynt est ale et tout defaile pIr
le male gouernance, per que nous deinaundoms iugenient et prions nions damagec.
STRAGWAYS. Sir, il poit estre que les condicyons soient enfreints de stin partie et
paremples del partie le dit Iohan [Pellam], issint que le dit Iolian [Pellam] ad cause
dauer le fait et nemy le pleintif, le quel nous lie poimus -auer -auns ceo que le dit Iohan
[Pellam] soit garny, si issint soit il serra mischiefe a nous destre charge de les damages
del pleintif lou i1 nad cause dauer le fait, et parauenture puiz donqes lautre a que le
droit del obligacion attient voit porter autre bref de delinite de mesme lobligacion enuert
nous et recouerer autrefoitz damages, et issint nous serroms ij. foitz charge des dam-
agez dun mesme chose, le quel serra mischiefe, par que etc. MAnMJ.;, UJ.] Si le
scire facias serra graunt ceo serra sur vn escrow mis y auant, le quel est nul fait en
ley a cause que il nest my enseale, et issint donqez par le graunt de scire facias cel escrov, e
serra accept pur vi bon et loial fait, le quel serra graund mischief, car donqes it
nauera iammes en apres liuere forsqez de mesme le fait, le quel nest que vn escrow,
pur ceo que par le graunt del scire facias ]a Icy entend que il accept que it fuit mesnie
le fait que il demaund per son bref et pur ceo de nul auter duist it auer leyde, le quel
serra graund mischiefe a luy, et pur ceo il dit a STrMN sGWAYS: Dites ceo que vous voille;
ou demurres en iugement et disputes en apres etc:' TiThe spelling of the black-letter
text has been corrected so far as possible).
1942]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
aver that the deed offered was the same one that was bailed to him by
the plaintiff and Pellam, and he repeated his prayer that Pellam be
garnished. The plaintiff then offered to aver that at the time of bail-
ment the obligation "fuit bon et loialment enseale one vn print sufficient
• . et issint esteant le fait en vostre gard le prynt est ale et tout defaile
per le male gouernance". The defendant in support of his prayer that
Pellam be garnished urged the customary argument against possible
double liability, but Martin, J., pointed out that "if scire facias shottld
be granted upon an escrow . . . which is no deed in law because it
hath not seal, then by the grant of scire facias this escrow would be
accepted for 'vn bon et loial fait' ", by the plaintiff, and that, lie said,
would be a great mischief to the plaintiff. While the report ends incon-
clusively it seems that the prayer for "interpleader by way of garnish-
ment" was not allowed; and, if indeed it was not, then it seems to fol-
low that the refusal to give the defendant relief against double liability
was due to his own "male gouernance" - or, as it is often put, "due
to his own folly that he is twice charged for the same thing."70
Res judicata. The question whether the judgment in the action
brought by the plaintiff against the bailee-defendant is res judicata as
against another claimant where scire facias issued to warn him is a
troublesome one. The question on analysis breaks down into two (1)
is the judgment res judicata where the garnishee appears, and (2) is it
res judicata if he is warned but does not appear so that the plaintiff
gets judgment by default? In an Anonymous case decided in 1456 this
question arose :71 C-1 brought a writ of detinue against A who pleaded
that the res sued for was delivered to him by C-1 and C-2 upon certain
conditions, etc., and he prayed garnishment of C-2. C-2 came in and
said that formerly he [C-2] had brought a writ de justicies directed to
the sheriff of Norfolk concerning this same res against this same de-
fendant, upon which the defendant had prayed that scire facias issue to
warn C-1 [the present plaintiff], and C-1 thereby had been warned and
had defaulted whereby he [C-2] had judgment. Littleton argued that
the garnishee could not plead such a plea because if such were the facts
then it was up to the defendant [A] to have pleaded them, and that since
the defendant had prayed that C-2 be garnished he had thereby "confesse
vncore le possession" of the res. 71 Prisot argued that the plea was good,
for, he said, "it would be contrary to reason" that a judgment given
in an earlier action between the same parties and for the same subject
matter should not be binding and a bar to this action. But here again,
unfortunately, the report is not conclusive and goes off on a question
70. Dictum by Martin, 3., in Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 43, pl. 20. See also, Y. B.
Trin. 34 Hen. VI 47, pl. 13.
71. Y. B. Trin. 34 Hen. VI 47, pl. 13.
72. See Y. B. Mich. 18 Edw. II p. 577 where plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged an
earlier default judgment against the proposed garnishee.
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concerning venue and jurisdiction in the earlier action. The evidence
is sparse but we have a dictum by Choke, J., in 20 Edward 1V (1490) 73
to the effect that the judgnent is not res judicata as against the garnishee
unless he appears. On the other hand Serjeant Collow in the same case
said: "where the sheriff has returned that we are garnished, then if we
do not appear [and judgment is given against us] the judgment would
be as strong [binding] as if we had appeared and judgment had been
given", and in support of his argument he drew analogy to prayer in
aid in cases of annuity where those prayed in aid are barred if scire
facias issued and they are served. It is hard to imagine what benefit
it would be to a defendant to be allowed to pray that a third party be
warned unless by such prayer he was protected from further suits for
the same thing. Certainly Collow used the more logical line of reasoning.
It appears that the judgment was res judicata where the garnishee came
in on scire facias ;74 the little available evidence does not make clear the
effect of a judgment taken by default after service of the writ."
B. "COMPULSORY INTERPLEADER"
We turn finally to the relief offered a person where all the claimants
to the chattel in his hands have suits pending against him for a recovery
of that chattel. In the first cases of this sort, joint bailors of a writing
have brought separate writs of detinue against their common bailee,
who is thus faced with two suits for the recovery of the same chattel
and with the possibility of double liability. It seems only fair in such
circumstances that if the bailee, or finder, has incurred no independent
liability to the various plaintiffs, they should be called upon to inter-
plead with respect to the right in the chattel sought. "I understand,"
said Choke, J., "that the cause of interpleader is in order that the de-
fendant shall not be twice charged where there is no default in him. ' ,
But there was another reason why two or more claimants to a chattel
73. Y. B. Mich. 20 Edw. IV 13, pl. 16.
74. But what if the sheriff returned that the one sought to be garnished could nfit
be found, or that he had naught by which he might be garnished, and then the gar-
nishee nevertheless appeared and was permitted to plead? If he lost would he be barred
in a later action brought by himself? See Y. B. 'Mich. 8 Hen. VI 16, pl. 41 vhere the
garnishee who made such an appearance was permitted, over plaintiff's objection, to
"interplead".
75. See also, Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 11, pl.42 and Y. B. Iich. 14 Edw. IV 2, pl.7.
Cf. Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191 (1932). It may be well to add that the cases we have
discussed here in connection with the theory of res judicata are all the more perplexing
when considered in the light of the early common law doctrine that affirmative relief
could not be given ordinarily against an absent defendant. The whole theory of the
history of the doctrine of res judicata is one which needs to be carefully gone into,
and the discussion here does not purport to do more than touch upon it insofar as it
relates to "interpleader".
76. Y. B. fich. 39 Hen. VI 36, pl. 1.
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should be called upon to plead with one another concerning the right
to a recovery of that chattel. If each of the separate plaintiffs recovered
against the defendant, to which of them should delivery of the chattel
be made? "I do not know to which," said Martin, J., "[for] if it were
delivered to one then the other would be without remedy.""r? The courts
very early recognized the need for relief in these cases, and relief was
afforded by the court's ordering (at the prayer of the defendant) that
adverse plaintiffs "interplead".T This remedy grew up concurrently with
"interpleader by way of garnishment"; arose, indeed, in the same type
of cases with the addition of one factor: here all the claimants had writs
of detinue pending against the defendant for the recovery of the same
chattel.79
The earliest case of this kind seems to be an Anonymous case decided
by the Court of Common Pleas in 1332.80 In that case C-1 brought a
writ of detinue against A and counted that he had bailed to A a charter
to be redelivered to him and"' to C-2 upon certain conditions, and that
he had performed the conditions wherefore redelivery should be made
to him. A pleaded that he had received the charter on the conditions
alleged, but that he did not know whether the conditions had been per-
formed as alleged by the plaintiff. He said, moreover, that C-2 had a
like writ of detinue pending against him concerning this same charter,
and that he stood ready to deliver to whomsoever the court should ad-
judge had the right. The writ of detinue brought by C-2 against A was
not returnable on the same day as the return of C-l's writ "wherefore
a common day was given to the parties upon this writ [i.e., upon the
writ brought by C-1] and scire facias was granted to warn the third
[party] to be present on the same day." In the majority of cases in
which we find the court ordering that the plaintiffs "interplead" their
writs are returnable on the same day, but that was not an essential re-
quirement for this form of relief.82 Nor did it seem to be essential that
the two writs of detinue were made returnable in the same county. 83
77. Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 43, pl. 20.
78. See RASTELL'S ENTRIES (1596) f. 213 for the entries on the record in caqcq of
this kind.
79. Y. B. Trin. 8 Edw. IV 6, pl. 3 (the defendant on praying that the plaintiffs
interplead must show that they claim the same thing).
80. Y. B. Mich. 6 Edw. III 38, pl. 11.
81. This is the reading of the text but the "and" is probably a mistake for "or".
82. In Y. B. Hil. 12 Hen. IV 18, pl. 17 we have a quacre by the reporter: "If the
writs had been returnable on different days, whether process should have been made."
In Y. B. Hil. 8 Hen. VI 30, pl. 27 Martin, J., held that adverse plaintiffs should inter-
plead regardless of the fact that their writs were returnable on different days, but that the
day upon which they should interplead should not be earlier than the latest date granted
to either of the two plaintiffs.
83. Y. B. Easter 5 Edw. IV f. 25 (Long Quinto). The case reported in Y. B. Anno
14 Hen. VI 2, pl. 6 can be distinguished on the ground that there the possibility existed
that the defendant had incurred independent liability to both plaintiffs.
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It was decided very early that the plaintiff whose writ bore the earlier
date should occupy the position of plaintiff in the proceedings between
the two plaintiffs,s4 and that the plaintiff whose writ was of later date
should occupy the defendant's place." However, if both writs bore the
same date then he who first counted against the defendant should occupy
the position of plaintiff and the other that of the defendant; unless the
court in its discretion should otherwise order.8 ' In the proceedings be-
tween the two plaintiffs the successful claimant got delivery of the chattel
sued for and also his damages.
87
Unlike a modern bill of interpleader the defendant in "interpleader" 
S3
at common law did not deposit the res in court. In fact, the court wo-uld
not permit the defendant to so deposit and step out of the picture.30
It is obvious that if the plaintiffs are to be required to interplead they
must not only be seeking the same thhig,") but that the defendant must
not have incurred an independent liability to either of them." If the
defendant by his own wilful misconduct had made himself liable toi two-
persons, there was no cause for them to interplead -they were not, in
short, seeking the same thing. So where a defendant accepted a bail-
ment from one party and then delivered the res he had accepted to
another party and took from him a rebailment he might well be liable
to both by his own "folly"Y- Justice does not require that two petople
who have separate and distinct claims against a third party be made
to litigate their claims as against themselves, but only that a party not
be held liable twice for one duty.
84. Y. B. Hil. 12 Hen. IV 18, pl. 17 (1. . . it is said that if tvo writs are return-
able on one day they shall plead on the one bearing earlier date."); Y. B. Mich. 3 Hen.
VI 20, pl. 2 (where the writs are of different dates it is immaterial '.hich of the plain-
tiffs counts first against defendant) ; Y. D. Easter 4 Edw. IV 9, pl. 11 (in an action in
which it was held that three adverse plaintiffs shtould interplead, it was -aid that "Cach
is an actor against the other, and each ought to be plaintiff against the other.").
85. Damages go against the plaintiff who occupies the place of the defendant, Y. 1..
Hil. 9 Edw. III 6, pl. 12. If the plaintiff who will be defendant defaults, judgment v.iU
go against him, Y. B. Mich. 17 Edw. III 391, pl. 97 (R. S.). The parties mut npFar
in propria persona, Y. B. Hil. 9 Edw. III 6, pi. 12.
86. Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 3, pl. 4 continued at f. 4, pl. 9 and f. 19, pi. 4U.
87. Y. B. Hil. 9 Edw. III 6, pl. 12 (party who took the position of plaintitt t'-
covered damages against the plaintiff who took the position of defendant, and rco,,Cr
the res from the original defendant). Accord, Y. B. Mich. 39 Hen. VI 36, Id. 1. But
see what appears to be a contrary holding in Y. B. Trin. 1 Edw. III 215, pl. 3 .R. S.)
(dictum, plaintiff who took position of defendant could recover only damages and not
res. Unless this case can be distinguished on the facts it is clearly out of line with
many other decisions).
88. This applies both to "interpleader by .%ay of garnishment" and to "compulsury
interpleader." As to the former see pp. 934-43 supra.
89. Y. B. Mich. 39 Hen. VI 36, pl. 1.
90. Y. B. Trin. 8 Edw. IV 6, pl. 3.
91. Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 43, pl. 20 and Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 2, pl. 6.
92. Y. B. Easter 3 Hen. VI 43, pl. 20.
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The question of whether or not privity need be shown to exist between
the adverse plaintiffs seems from the very first to have been decided
in the negative. The first case in which the question seems to have been
argued with any show of force is that of Rafe Cro mwel v. Edinound
Moris, decided by the Court of Common Pleas in 1424. 3 In that case
the defendant pleaded that one Gray had a like writ pending against him
for the recovery of the same chattel as that now sought and he prayed
that Cromwell and Gray interplead concerning their right to the chattel.
Martin, J. - whose views finally prevailed - said, "It seems to me that
they should be compelled to interplead for otherwise the defendant would
be in great mischief for if he were to answer to one and to the other
severally, then if it were found against the defendant and for the plain-
tiff in each case, each of them would have judgment to recover the
writing, and so he would be twice charged for the same thing which
would be contrary to reason. . . ." In support of this reasoning Bab-
ington, J., also pointed out that "it would be inconvenient that two
severally ought to have the same thing." Moreover, both contended, if
the defendant were a mere finder he should have "interpleader" in spite
of the fact that neither bailment nor privity existed. And, in the end
they held that the plaintiffs must "interplead". In a case four years later
(1428) the defendant pleaded to a writ of detinue that he had found
the writings sued for "per fortune" and claimed naught in them and that
since another had sued him on a like writ that the two plaintiffs should
interpleadY4 The plaintiff objected on the ground that the defendant
had "traversed the bailment and not the detinue", but again Martin, J.,
allowed the defendant his prayer for "interpleader relief". 5 From here
it was but a short step to allowing interpleader even where one plaintiff
sued in detinue and counted upon a bailment, and the other plaintiff
sued in detinue and counted upon trover. 0 And even the fact that there
were three separate writs of detinue by three separate sets of plaintiffs
against the defendant seeking the same res did not prevent a common
law court from awarding that the three sets of plaintiffs interplead. 7
93. Ibid.
94. Y. B. Easter 7 Hen. VI 22, pl. 3.
95. Ibid. Martin, J.: "In the manner he pleads he traverses the bailment for other-
wise his plea would serve him naught . . . and the possession came to him by fortune
and he claims naught and may not plead in bar, but each of you who have writs pending
claim the deed, wherefore it is reasonable that you interplead and that each show his
right."
96. Y. B. Mich. 39 Hen. VI 36, pl. 1. Lack of privity was also held to be no bar in
the following cases: Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 3, pl. 6; Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 4, pl. 9;
Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 19, pl. 40; Y. B. Easter 4 Edw. IV 9, pl. 11; and Y. B. Easter
5 Edw. IV f. 25 (Long Quinto). The dicta in Y. B. Anno 14 Hen. VI 2, pl. 6 and Y. B.
Trin. 33 Hen. VI 25, pl. 8 deny interpleader to the defendant not because of lack of
privity but because it was questionable whether the two plaintiffs were seeking the
same thing, and possible that the defendant might have incurred independent liability.
97. Y. B. Easter 4 Edw. IV 9, pl. 11.
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Thus "interpleader" in detinue cases-- which because of procedural
reasons might take one of two forms as outlined above-was an ex-
tremely just and liberal method by which a defendant rMight prevent
a possible double liability with respect to one duty. The only require-
ments were that the claimants"8 seek the same thing; that the defendant
be under no independent liability by reason of his own wrongdoing; and,
that the defendant stand indifferently between the adverse parties.93
"Modernizing Interpleader"? The Federal Tnterpleader Act of 1936
reads as if it might have been drawn by Justice Martin in the fifteenth
century!
III. CONCLUSION
The history of our law is one of slow but gradual growth. As the
needs and occasions arise and multiply, so too do the writs and modes
of relief come into being and take definite shape. This it seems has
been the history of the modern bill of interpleader. Ve have been told,
however, that "Interpleader is not an invention of the Chancellor, but
is borrowed from the old common-law writ of interpleader, 00 which like
other peculiar writs, gradually disappeared after the introduction of
the jury"10 ' And that "The Writ of garnishment 0 - was closely related
to interpleader . . . Garnishment . . . [being] analogous to defensive
interpleader at law under modern statutes, just as the writ of inter-
pleader [sic] is analogous to a bill of interpleader in equity."1 It is
submitted that this is not so, but rather that the law began first to give
"interpleader relief" in cases involving two or more claims to the ward-
ship of a minor and his lands; that with the development of the writ
of detinue it was carried over to give relief to a bailee or finder who
was subject to two or more claims or suits with respect to one thing.
Interpleader at common law, however, was never more than defensive
interpleader. The applicant for relief was always a defendant in an
action at law, and herein lay its great weakness. The defendant was
subject to expenses in coming in and asking that the two plaintiffs (or
98. Or plaintiffs, as we have seen pp. 934-43 supra.
99. No case has been found in which the defendant claimed an interest in the res
being sued for. There are dicta by Martin, and Babington, JJ., in Y. B. Easter 3 Hen.
VI 43, pl. 20 which indicate, however, that the defendant must not claim an interest.
100. A writ of interpleader w%-as  thing unknown to the common law. No example
of such a writ appears in any copy of REGIsmoum BREVIUM that I have examined.
101. CA, E, CASES oN EQUITAI R MIEDIEs (1938) I.
102. As we have seen, there was no such thing as a writ of garnishment. Scire facias
wvas the writ by which the adverse claimant was garnished (i.e., warned to come in).
103. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 101, at 2. To say that "the writ of interpleader [at
common lawv] is analogous to a bill of interpleader in equity" is to ignore completely
the whole history of our common law and of the writ system through which it per-
ated. Interpleader at common law was allowed only defensively.
1942] 947
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51: 924
one plaintiff and a claimant) "enterpled". More important still, he had
to wait until one or both of the claimants took the initiative.10 4
Concurrently with the growth and development of the common law
there was growth and development of the Chancellor's equitable juris-
diction.' The equitable character of the justices in eyre in the reigns
of Edward I, Edward II, and Edward III was to have a profound in-
fluence on the development of equity, for it is in those eyres that we find
many of the origins of equitable jurisdiction."0 ' The justices in eyre at
Northamptonshire in 3-4 Edward III (1329-30) declared that it was
104. So far as I can discover "interpleader" at common law was limited to writ,,
of wardship and detinue. Professor Chafee says, however, that "Interpleader was also
allowed to a person subjected to double vexation from various obsolete actions. For
example, if a bishop was asked by two different persons to appoint two respective cler-
gymen to a single church, the advowson being claimed by each of the contestants, inter-
pleader furnished an excellent refuge to the bishop from two actions of quare inpedil."
CHAFLE, 10c. cit. supra note 101. This statement is made apparently upon the authority
of Reeves, who in support of a like statement cites the case of Y. B. Easter 19 Hen. VI
67, pl. 14. (Reeves cites it merely "19 Hen. VI 68": the case begins on folio 67).
The point raised in that case is simply this: A brings a writ of quare impedit con-
cerning the advowson of C against B. B in turn brings a like writ against A con-
cerning the same advowson. Upon which writ should they plead? The case has nothing
at all to do with interpleader, even using that word in its loosest sense. It is quite easy
to see the chain of events in which such an historical blunder was perpetuated. Brooke
quite mistakenly put a note of the case under the title Enterpleder (No. 26), and the
printers or editors of the quarto and vulgate texts of the Year Books put in the mar-
gin "Enterpleder Br. 26". It does not take much investigation to disclose that Reeves
relied almost entirely upon Brooke's Abridgment for his Year Book cases and seeing
there a case of quare impedit under the title "Enterpleder" he had only to use a little
imagination and loose thinking to work out the statement that a bishop confronted with
two claimants to an advowson could interplead them. And so has the error conic down
to us to this day. Reeves also remarks that interpleader was allowed at common law
with respect to adverse claimants to an office. The interpleader in such cases was in
Chancery, not at common law. See note 109 infra. The entire discussion, as has been
remarked, of "garnishment" and "interpleader" at common law in Reeves' work is taken
almost wholly (if, indeed, not wholly) from Brooke's Abridgment, and that Abridgment
for those two titles contains only about one twenty-fifth of such cases to be found in
the Year Books.
105. "The equitable jurisdiction began with the Council, and not with the Chan-
cellor. It became exclusively the Chancellor's, probably by delegation from the Council,
towards the end of the fifteenth century, but the details are unknown." BAILDON, SELEC'r
CASES IN CHANCERY xlv, 10 SELDEN SocIaTY (1896).
106. Unfortunately the reports of many of these eyres have never been printed, al-
though we have manuscripts in abundance. See Rogers, Manuscript Year Books for
1-10 Edward 111 (1327-37) (1940) 50 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REviEw 573, and Rogers, A
Source for Fitzherbert's 'La Graunde Abridgment' (1941) 51 id. at 605. Professor Beale
and other legal scholars have urged for the past quarter of a century that these cyre
reports be edited and printed. Until this is done the real history of the origin of equity
jurisdiction must remain to be told. See also, THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS (1908) 374-76,
and the preface to Rogers, Year Book, Eyre of London 14 Edward I1 (1321) (1941)
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contrary to law that the same right should be adjudged to be in two
adverse claimants, and forced those claimants to "interplead" in order
that the right should be adjudged in the proper party. °7 The Chancellor
from as early as 131010s had exercised a procedure "in the nature of
interpleader" in cases where adverse claimants laid claim to the same
office or lands which had devolved upon the king by reason of the death
of his tenant." 9 Influenced not only by that procedure but likewise by
the equitable character of the justices itinerant and by the "interpleader
relief" afforded certain defendants at common law, he soon began to
exercise an extensive interpleader jurisdiction of his own. He could
107. Y. B. Eyre of Northampton 3-4 Edw. III, Harvard University Law Library
MS 3, f. 24v: "John of Pateshulle was summoned [to answer] by what warrant he
claimed waif in his manor of T. John claimed it as appendant to the same manor, and
he said that he and his ancestors have had and used it always. Upon this [one] Wil-
liam of Clynton came and said that the aforesaid manor where John claimed waif is
within the hundred of L, and he said that he and his ancestors have had and used
always [the right to take] waif in the afore-said manor. ScmorE, [J.) therefore com-
pelled them to interplead because if they both pleaded separately to the quo Trarranto
then perchance the franchise might be adjudged to one and to the other, which would
be contrary to law. Wherefore John of Pateshulle said that he and his ancestors have
had and used waif in the manors aforesaid absquc hoc that William of Clynton or his
ancestors were seized of this franchise. And the other to the contrary. And William
said that he and his ancestors have had and used waif always in the same manor absque
hoc that this John of Pateshulle or any of his ancestors, as above. ALDEUflumn said for
the king that neither the one nor the other had been seized by prescription if neither they
nor their ancestors [etc.] ready etc. And upon this issue was joined." Some of the
manuscripts give "counterpled" and some "enterpled" for the word translated above
as "interplead".
108. But see note 105 supra.
109. Knoville v. Plukenet, Y. B. MIich. 4 Edw. I 115, pl. 27 (1310), is the earliest
case in which I find reference to adverse claimants to lands which have come into the
king's hands by reason of his tenant's death being called upon to interplead "in equity"
as to their right. For further proceedings in that case see PLciTont Aiii_,O%,iAT
(1811) 310 where the pedigrees of the two sets of claimants may be seen in diagram.
And see DiCm. NAT. Bio. sub. nor. Alan Plugenet and Robert Walerand. Perhaps a
still earlier instance of "interpleader in Chancery" may be seen in the case of the Bishup
of Sabin 4. Bedewynde (1307) S.LECr CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL 18, 35 Sau. ;
SociLrTY (1918). In that case both the Bishop and Walter laid claim to the treasury-
ship of the church of York; the former by right, the latter by grant from the king. The
king ordered the council (see note 105 supra) to do what "should be d,,ne according t.'
reason." For further cases in Chancery concerning the right to an office in v, hich two'
or more claimants were said to "interplead" with respect thereto see, Y. B. 'Mich. 35 Hen.
VI f. 19r; Y. B. Trin. 5 Edw. IV 4, pl. 4; Y. B. Trin. 11 Edw. IV 1, p. 1; Y. B.
Mich. 15 Edw. IV 10, pl. 16 continued in Y. B. Easter 16 Edw. IV 4, pl. 8; Y. B. Easter
1 Hen. VII 14, pl. 1; Y. B. Trin. 21 Hen. VII 35, pl. 44; Y. B. Trin. 23 Hen. VII 94,
pl. 10 (Keilwey) ; and Y. B. Easter 7 Hen. VIII f. 177 (Keilwey). In Y. B. Trin. 23
Hen. VII 94, pl. 10 (Keilwey) we find the interesting statement "lenterpleder tie gist en
le Chancery, mes lou ils sont troves heirs per divers offices a un person, car le enter-
pleder nest auter forsque pur trier le privitie de sanke." May not privty have been
an invention of the Chancellor?
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"head-off" threatened suits by two or more adverse claimants against
the same party for the same res, and under threat of duress he could
compel the losing claimant to pay the applicant's expenses. After 1483
the action of detinue seems to have been in disfavor. Indeed, the reports
of Henry VII and Henry VIII contain only a scattering of such cases,
and so far as we can discover there is a complete dearth of detinue actions
in which "interpleader" was sought by the defendant. In 1484 we have
what appears to be the earliest bill of interpleader in equity.110 Equity
jurisdiction was expanding to a point where it was soon to come into
open conflict with the common law. In the final contest for superiority
between law and equity, equity won out and an extensive interpleader
jurisdiction, won by reason of the popularity of the relief granted, came
to be an exclusive jurisdiction. 11' These, it is submitted, were the his-
torical origins of the modern bill of interpleader.
110. Flyyke v. Banyard, 1 Cal. Ch. cxv (1484). Peverell v. Huse, 1 Cal. Ch. cxxii
(1493) appears to be the second bill of interpleader in equity. The earliest known in-
stance of a technically strict bill of interpleader is Alnete v. Bettam & E. Marmnyon,
Cary 65 (1560). The early records of Chancery are quite inadequately edited and it
is difficult to base conclusions upon the Calendar alone.
111. For an interesting account and a collection of the authorities concerning this
historic conflict see, 1 CHAvEE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQuITY (1934) 35-36.
[Vol. 51 : 92,4
